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It was a long time coming. A quarter-century ago-before most of my
current civil procedure students entered this world-the Supreme Court decided
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.' Asahi failed to generate a majority
opinion on how to assess whether jurisdiction is proper over a defendant whose
products reach a state through the so-called "stream of commerce." 2 Shortly

*Professor of Law & Michael J. Zimmer Fellow, Seton Hall University School of
Law. This
Article benefitted greatly from the comments and insights of my co-panelists at this SymposiumJudge Joseph Anderson, Richard Freer, Danielle Holley-Walker, Arthur Miller, Wendy Perdue,
Justice Costa Pleicones, Linda Silberman, Allan Stein, Howard Stravitz, and John Vail. I am also
grateful to Jenny Carroll, Robin Effron, Ed Hamett, Denis McLaughlin, and Charles Sullivan,
whose thoughts about the McIntyre case have been very helpful to me in preparing this Article.
Finally, thanks to the board and members of the South Carolina Law Review, both for organizing a
terrific symposium and for their excellent editorial work on this Article.
1. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
2.
See id. at 105 ("This case presents the question whether the mere awareness on the part of
a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United
States would reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes 'minimum contacts'
between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare id. at 111-13 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, J., Scalia, J.), with id. at 117, 121 (Brennan, J., joined by White,
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thereafter, the Court's decision in Burnham v. Superior Court3 yielded no
majority opinion on how to evaluate the constitutionality of transient or "tag"
jurisdiction. 4 In the wake of these back-to-back inconclusive decisions, the
Supreme Court avoided personal jurisdiction for more than two decades.
That hiatus ended last Term, when the Supreme Court decided two personal
5
jurisdiction cases: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
and Goodyear
6
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown. The more controversial of the two is

Mcintyre-a stream of commerce case raising issues similar to those that were
left unresolved in Asahi. As with the last time the Court waded into that stream,
the Supreme Court generated three non-majority opinions. It is a remarkable
coincidence, given that eight of the nine current Justices were not on the Court
when Asahi was decided. 7 The more things change, the more they stay the same.
Six of the Justices in McIntyre conclude that the plaintiff, Mr. Nicastro, did
not meet his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction in New Jersey over the
British manufacturer. 8 But the Justices split 4-to-2-to-3 in analyzing this
question. The "four" are led by Justice Kennedy, who writes a plurality opinion
rejecting jurisdiction on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas. 9 The "three" are led by Justice Ginsburg, who writes a
dissenting opinion that would have upheld jurisdiction on behalf of herself and
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.' Justices Breyer and Alito tip the scale by
providing two more votes against jurisdiction, but their concurring opinion,
written by Justice Breyer, rejects the reasoning used by the Kennedy plurality."1
As explained below, the legal principles on which Justices Breyer and Alito rely
are generally consistent with Justice Ginsburg's approach, but they vote
against
2
McIntyre.1
in
record
factual
the
of
view
narrow
a
on
based
jurisdiction
Despite the lack of a majority opinion in McIntyre, the decision is potentially
quite significant. As an initial matter, McIntyre may be instructive on where the
current Justices stand on these issues. Justice Scalia is the only current Justice

J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., concurring), and id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also infra
text accompanying notes 42-59 (discussing Asahi).
3.
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
4.
See id. at 607 ("The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment denies California courts jurisdiction over a nonresident, who was personally
served with process while temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated to his activities in the
State."). Compare id. at 609-19 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., Kennedy, J.), with
id. at 629-40 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., O'Connor, J., concurring), and id.
at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5.
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
6.
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
7.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
8. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion); id. at 2794 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
9. Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion); see also discussion infra Part III.
10. Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also discussion infra Part IV.
11. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also discussion infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.A.
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who was involved in Asahi.13 And Justices Scalia and Kennedy are the only
current Justices who were involved in Burnham.14 So despite McIntyre's
inconclusive nature, it gives us insight into how the current Justices are thinking
about personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, McIntyre may indicate a renewed interest-at least for some
Justices-in how jurisdictional doctrine operates in the current technological
landscape. Justices Breyer and Alito note that "there have been many recent
changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by
our precedents;" 15 they cite the development of the internet in particular.
Although they express concern that McIntyre was "an unsuitable vehicle for
making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules,"' 17 they
signal that they might be open to a "change in present law" if presented with a
case that provides "a better understanding of the relevant contemporary
commercial circumstances," especially "a case (unlike the present one) in which
the Solicitor General participates." '1 8 Such commentary suggests a desire to
consider these overarching questions more comprehensively in light of modern
realities, although how eagerly the Justices will seek out that opportunity
remains to be seen.
Until that next case reaches One First Street, judges and litigants may ask
themselves whether any aspect of the McIntyre decision generates binding
precedent going forward. The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' 9 Given this principle (known as the Marks rule), it is hard
to see how Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion-standing alone-could qualify
as the McIntyre holding. If any opinion qualifies under Marks as the one
"concur[ring] . ..on the narrowest grounds, ' 2° it would seem to be Justice

Breyer's. 21 As explained below, Justice Breyer's rejection of jurisdiction in
McIntyre is premised on a restricted understanding of the factual record in that
case, and his position is consistent with upholding jurisdiction in a similar case

13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 606-07 (1990).
15. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
16 . Id. at 2793 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's jurisdictional standards by asking: "[W]hat do
those standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web site?
And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products
through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if
the company markets its products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a
forum?").
17. Id.
18. Id. at2794.
19. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
20. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 218-222.
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where the record contains slightly more robust evidence on certain issues
relating to actual or potential purchasers in the forum state.22 Although the
Court's ultimate conclusion in McIntyre is to reverse the New Jersey court's
exercise of jurisdiction, 23 McIntyre should not be read to impose more significant
restraints on jurisdiction as a general matter.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the two most significant
pre-McIntyre decisions on personal jurisdiction and stream of commerceWorld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 24 and Asahi. Part II describes the
Court's long-awaited return to personal jurisdiction last Term in McIntyre, as
well as its companion case Goodyear. Parts III, IV, and V examine the three
McIntyre opinions-Justice Kennedy's plurality, Justice Ginsburg's dissent, and
Justice Breyer's concurrence.
I.

BEFORE MCINTYRE

When discussing the modem approach to personal jurisdiction and the
stream of commerce, one often begins with World-Wide Volkswagen. The
plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen were injured while driving an automobile
through Oklahoma. 25 They had purchased the car from a dealership in New
York. 6 They filed a lawsuit in Oklahoma state court against several defendants,
including the New York car dealership and a New York distributor that served
dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 27 These two defendants
28
argued that personal jurisdiction was improper in Oklahoma.
The Supreme Court held that exercising i urisdiction over these defendants in
Oklahoma violated the Due Process Clause. 9 In doing so, however, the Court

recognized that it is appropriate for a state to "assert[] personal jurisdiction over
a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 3 It
further explained:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor.., arises from
the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra text accompanying notes 199-207.
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 288-89.
Id. at 288.
Id. at295-99.
Id. at 298.
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defective 31merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or
to others.

Jurisdiction was ultimately denied in World- Wide Volkswagen because these
two New York defendants had not sought to serve, either directly or indirectly,
the market for their product in the forum state of Oklahoma.32 The local dealer

and the regional distributor served the markets in New York and surrounding
states.33 The automobile involved in the accident had been sold to a local New

York customer, 34 but it found its way to Oklahoma via the customer's "unilateral
activity," 35 not by any effort on the part of the defendants to reach the Oklahoma
market with their products. 36 Accordingly, it did not matter whether Oklahoma
had a strong interest in adjudicating a dispute arising from an accident that
occurred in Oklahoma, or whether Oklahoma would be "the most convenient
location for litigation." 37 The defendants' lack of "contacts, ties, or relations"

with Oklahoma made jurisdiction unconstitutional. 38

Thus, World-Wide Volkswagen presaged a two-step approach to personal

jurisdiction that crystallized during the 1980s. First, the defendant must
"purposefully establish[] 'minimum contacts' in the forum State. ' 39 Second,
"[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum
contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion ofaersonal jurisdiction would
Factors relevant to this
comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.'
second prong-which confirms "the reasonableness of jurisdiction"-include
"the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of

31. Id. at 297.
32. See id. at 298.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 288.
35. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 294 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254). The Court explained that the Due
Process Clause might forbid jurisdiction "[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation." Id. (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254).
38. Id. at 299 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also id.
at 295 ("[W]e find in the record before us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are
a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.").
39. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 316).
40. Id. at 476 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
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controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.

'a

The Court's next stream of commerce case was Asahi.42 In this case a
California plaintiff was injured, and his wife killed, while riding a motorcycle on
a California highway.43 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in California state court
against several defendants, including the Taiwanese company (Cheng Shin) that
manufactured the motorcycle's tire tube."4 Cheng Shin then filed a claim
seeking indemnification from the Japanese company (Asahi) that manufactured
the tube's valve assembly but had not been named as a defendant. 45 Asahi
objected to jurisdiction. 46 The plaintiff's claims eventually settled, "leaving only
Cheng Shin's indemnity action against Asahi." 47
Asahi was, in one sense, a mirror image of World-Wide Volkswagen. In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the lack of minimum contacts by the defendants made

jurisdiction unconstitutional, regardless of whether the reasonableness factors
48
In Asahi, the reasonableness factors
weighed in favor of jurisdiction.
prevented jurisdiction regardless of whether the defendant had established the
required minimum contacts.49

The Court's holding that jurisdiction was

unreasonable in Asahi was based on that case's fairly unique posture, especially
the fact that the original plaintiff-who had been injured in the forum state-had
settled and was not seeking any relief from Asahi. 5 A question of more general
interest was whether a defendant in Asahi's position had established minimum
contacts with the forum state; on that issue, the Court generated no majority
opinion.

41. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
42. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
43. Id. at 105.
44. Id. at 105-06.
45. Id. at 106.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
49. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-14 ("We have previously explained that the determination of
the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of
several factors .... A consideration of these factors in the present case clearly reveals the
unreasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi, even apart from the question of the
placement of goods in the stream of commerce."); id. at 114 ("[Tlhe interests of the plaintiff and the
forum in California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi are slight. All that remains is a claim for
indemnification asserted by Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation, against Asahi.... Because the
plaintiff is not a California resident, California's legitimate interests in the dispute have
considerably diminished."). Justice Scalia was the only Justice in Asahi who did not join Justice
O'Connor's opinion with respect to the reasonableness factors. See id. at 105.
50. Id.at 106; see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1067.1 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that the Court "refused to exercise personal
jurisdiction ... because of the particular circumstances of the case").

2012]

EXAMINING THE THREE OPINIONS IN MCINTYRE

Four Justices, led by Justice O'Connor, concluded that Asahi had not
established minimum contacts with California. 5' Four Justices, led by Justice
Brennan, concluded that Asahi had established minimum contacts with
California. 52 Justice Stevens joined neither of the four-Justice coalitions in
Asahi. Given the conclusion "that California's exercise of jurisdiction over
Asahi in this case would be 'unreasonable and unfair,"' he saw "no reason" to
endorse any particular "test as the nexus between an act of a defendant and the
forum State that is necessary to establish minimum contacts. 53
The different perspectives offered by Justices Brennan and O'Connor in
Asahi would go on to shape much of the jurisdictional debate in the decades
following Asahi.54 Quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan reasoned

that "[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by

consumers in the forum State." 55 Justice O'Connor, however, wrote that
"placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act
of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." 56 Rather, she
would require "[a]dditional conduct" that would,
[I]ndicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for
example, designing the product for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State.57
Thus, it is often said that Justice Brennan endorsed a "stream of commerce"
analysis while Justice O'Connor endorsed a "stream of commerce plus"
analysis.58 It should not be overlooked, however, that both Justices Brennan and

51. See id. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J.).
52. Id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 116). That said, Justice Stevens
wrote that he was "inclined to conclude" that Asahi's contacts were sufficient given "the volume,
the value, and the hazardous character of the components." Id. at 122.
54. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aerohawk Aviation, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1105 (D. Idaho 2003) ("[T]he circuits have split over whether to follow Justice O'Connor or Justice
Brennan's articulation of the 'stream of commerce' theory." (citing cases)).
concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
55. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119-20 (Brennan, J.,
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 112 (O'Connor, J.).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546-49 (11th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing between a "stream of commerce" analysis and a "stream of commerce plus"
analysis); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§ 1067.1 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion "developed what has now
become known as the 'stream-of-commerce-plus' theory of jurisdiction").
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O'Connor explicitly embraced the idea that a manufacturer establishes minimum
contacts with the forum when it seeks to serve the market in the forum state and
its product thereby causes injury in that state.59
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S

2011

PERSONAL JURISDICTION DECISIONS

In September 2010, the Court granted certiorari in two cases involving
jurisdiction over defendants whose products reached the forum state via the
stream of commerce. 6° The two cases-McIntyre and Goodyear-weredecided
on June 27, 2011, the last day of the October 2010 Term.
In Goodyear, the

claim involved a product that both was purchased and caused injury outside of
the forum state (North Carolina).6 2

The court thus sought to assert general

63
jurisdiction based on other sales of the defendants' products in North Carolina.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that general jurisdiction was improper,
concluding that "even regularly occurring sales of a product in a State
64 do not
justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales."
McIntyre was a more traditional stream of commerce case. It implicated
specific jurisdiction because the lawsuit was brought in the state where the
product was purchased and where the injury occurred. 65 The plaintiff, Robert
Nicastro, suffered serious injuries to his hand while operating a metal-shearin
machine at Curcio Scrap Metal, the New Jersey company for which he worked.
Mr. Nicastro filed a lawsuit in a New Jersey state court against J. McIntyre

59. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J.) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297); id. at 119 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98);
see also id. at 112 (O'Connor, J.) (stating that jurisdiction is permissible if the defendant's conduct
"indicate[s] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State" (emphasis added)).
60. See Goodyear Lux. Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010) (granting certiorari); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 62 (2010) (granting certiorari).
61. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (decided June 27, 2011);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011) (same).
62. See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2850.
63. Id. at 2851 ("Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in France, and the
tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts
lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy .... Were the foreign subsidiaries
nonetheless amenable to general jurisdiction in North Carolina courts? ...[T]he North Carolina
courts answered yes.").
64. Id. at 2850, 2857 n.6.
65. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2797-98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Goodyear
was a case purporting to exercise "general (all-purpose) jurisdiction" while McIntyre was "one of
specific jurisdiction, which turns on an 'affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy' (quoting Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851)).
66. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion); id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Nicastro operated
the [machine] in the course of his employment at Curcio Scrap Metal (CSM) in Saddle Brook, New
Jersey." (citing Joint Appendix at 7a, 43a, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780
(2011) (No. 09-1343), 2010 WL 4642529)).
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Machinery, the British corporation that manufactured the shearing machine. 67 J.
McIntyre had entered into an agreement with an Ohio-based company, McIntyre
Machinery of America, to sell J. McIntyre's machines to customers in the United
States. J. McIntyre also helped to facilitate sales of its machines in the United
States by sending its officials to U.S. trade shows in "such cities
69 as Chicago, Las
Francisco."
San
and
Diego,
San
Orlando,
Orleans,
New
Vegas,
Beyond these basic points, the Justices' opinions describe the facts relevant

to jurisdiction in different ways. For example, the opinions by Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg state, and the record confirms, that the machine involved in the
accident was sold by J. McIntyre to its U.S. distributor, which in turn sold the

machine directly to Mr. Nicastro's employer in New Jersey.70 Justice Kennedy's
opinion, however, states that the machine somehow "ended up in New Jersey.'

67. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion); id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that J.
McIntyre was "[established in 1872 as a United Kingdom corporation, and headquartered in
Nottingham, England" (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 22a)).
68. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion) ("[An independent company agreed to sell J. McIntyre's
machines in the United States."); id. at 2790 ("The distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre's machines
in the United States .... ); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. [is] a
British firm that manufactures scrap-metal machines in Great Britain and sells them through an
independent distributor in the United States .... ); id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("From at
least 1995 until 2001, McIntyre UK retained an Ohio-based company, McIntyre Machinery
America, Ltd .... 'as its exclusive distributor for the entire United States."' (quoting Nicastro v.
McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), rev'd, J. McIntyre,
131 S. Ct. 2780)); Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 578 (N.J. 2010) (noting
that McIntyre Machinery of America's headquarters were in Stow, Ohio), rev'd, J. McIntyre, 131 S.
Ct. 2780; Nicastro, 945 A.2d at 95 (noting that McIntyre Machinery of America was "an Ohio
corporation with its principal place of business in Stow, Ohio"); id. at 96 ("Notwithstanding the
apparent absence of a written contract, defendant does not dispute that McIntyre America was its
sole United States distributor during the relevant time period.").
69. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nicastro, 987 A.2d at
578-79); see also id. at 2786 (plurality opinion) ("J. McIntyre officials attended annual conventions
for the scrap recycling industry to advertise J. McIntyre's machines alongside the distributor. The
conventions took place in various States, but never in New Jersey.").
70. See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that J. McIntyre's U.S. distributor "sold
and shipped one machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer, Mr.
Curcio"); id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The machine arrived in Nicastro's New Jersey
workplace not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and distribution
system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged."). The machine that caused Nicastro's injuries was
manufactured by J. McIntyre, Ltd. in the United Kingdom and then sold for $24,900 in 1995
through its exclusive United States distributor, McIntyre America, to a New Jersey business, Curcio
Scrap Metal. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 577-78. Defendant shipped the machine from England to
McIntyre America's headquarters in Stow, Ohio, which then shipped it to Saddle Brook, New
Jersey, with an invoice instructing that a check be made payable to "McIntyre Machinery of
America, Inc." for the machine. Id.; Nicastro, 945 A.2d at 96. Nicastro's employer purchased the
machine "after the employer attended a national trade convention in Las Vegas, Nevada and learned
about the machine at a booth exhibit jointly operated by the manufacturer and distributor." Id. at
95; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 43a (Copy of Invoice).
71. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion); id. at 2790 ("[U]p to four machines
ended up in New Jersey."); see also id. (describing the trial court's finding that "defendant does not
have a single contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question ending up in this state"
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Justice Ginsburg's opinion states, and the record confirms, that Mr.
Nicastro's New Jersey employer first learned of the machine at one of the very
same trade conventions that J. McIntyre's officials attended in an effort to
72
promote their machines to potential U.S. customers. Neither Justice Kennedy's
nor Justice Breyer's opinion addresses this link between J. McIntyre's own
activities in the United States and the purchase of the machine by the New Jersey
company for whom Mr. Nicastro worked. 73 In addition, Justice Ginsburg's
opinion cites several facts regarding the role these industry trade shows play in
the market for such machines, the number of New Jersey businesses belonging to
the industry group that hosted the trade shows, the amount of scrap metal
recycling activity in New Jersey, and New Jersey's share of the overall U.S.
market for imports of manufactured goods.74 Justice Kennedy's opinion does

not acknowledge these facts.

Justice Breyer does not consider them either,

(quoting Petition for Certiorari App. F at 130a, J.McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (No. 09-1343) 2010
WL 1789706) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. See id. at 2795-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Frank Curcio 'first heard of [McIntyre
UK's] machine while attending an Institute of Scrap Metal Industries [(ISRI)] convention in Las
Vegas in 1994 or 1995, where [McIntyre UK] was an exhibitor."' Id. at 2795 (alteration in original)
(quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 78a) (affidavit of Frank Curcio). "McIntyre UK
representatives attended every ISRI convention from 1990 through 2005." Id. at 2796 (citing Joint
Appendix, supra note 66, at 114a-115a) (answers to interrogatories). See also Nicastro, 987 A.2d
at 579 ("Michael Pownall, the president of J.McIntyre, attended the scrap metal conventions held in
Las Vegas in 1994 and 1995, including the one where Curcio visited the McIntyre America
booth."); Nicastro, 945 A.2d at 95 ("Plaintiffs employer purchased the machine new from the
manufacturer's exclusive United States distributor, an Ohio corporation, after the employer attended
a national trade convention in Las Vegas, Nevada and learned about the machine at a booth exhibit
jointly operated by the manufacturer and distributor."); id. at 96 ("Curcio learned that the machine
was manufactured by defendant in England and distributed throughout the United States by its sole
United States distributor, McIntyre America. Based upon that contact, Curcio ordered the
machine.").
73. Other aspects of the record are also handled differently by the three opinions. Regarding
J. McIntyre's direct efforts to access the U.S. market, Justice Kennedy's opinion acknowledges (and
the record confirms) that: (1)J.McIntyre "held both United States and European patents on its
recycling technology"; (2) J. McIntyre's "U.S. distributor 'structured [its] advertising and sales
efforts in accordance with' J. McIntyre's 'direction and guidance whenever possible".; and (3) "'at
least some of the machines were sold on consignment to' the [U.S.] distributor." J. McIntyre, 131
S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion) (first alteration in original) (quoting Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 579).
Justice Ginsburg's opinion recognizes these facts as well, and it also adds (as confirmed by the
record) that: (1) J. McIntyre's "manual advises 'owner[s] and operators ...[to] make themselves
aware of [applicable health and safety regulations],' including 'the American National Standards
Institute Regulations (USA) for the use of Scrap Metal Processing Equipment"'; (2) J.McIntyre's
U.S. distributor described itself in invoices and other communications as J. McIntyre's "national
distributor, 'America's Link' to 'Quality Metal Processing Equipment' from England"; and (3) J.
McIntyre engaged its U.S. distributor "to attract customers 'from anywhere in the United States,"'
instructing the distributor that "[a]ll we wish to do is sell our products in the [United] States-and
get paid!" Id. at 2795-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (first three and last alterations in original)
(quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 43a, 46a, 78a 134a, 161a) (last set of internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice Breyer's opinion does not acknowledge these facts.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 96-100.
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suggesting that they were not part of "the record present here.",75 Rather, Justice
"the
Breyer's analysis considered only three facts-those
76 on which, in his view,
Supreme Court of New Jersey relied most heavily.,

Finally, there appears to be some disagreement about how many of J.
McIntyre's machines ultimately reached the New Jersey market.

Justice

Kennedy recognizes that "up to four machines" may have been purchased by
New Jersey

customers,77 but Justice Breyer's reasoning hinges on the

one that injured Mr. Nicastro-was
assumption that only a single machine-the
78

ever sold to a New Jersey user.
As Justice Kennedy puts it in his plurality opinion, the McIntyre case
"present[ed] an opportunity to provide greater clarity" about the permissible

scope of jurisdiction in stream-of-commerce cases,79 noting in particular the
"decades-old questions left open in Asahi.'

8°

The lack of any majority opinion

in McIntyre largely thwarts the possibility of "greater clarity," at least in the
short term. Going forward, however, the three McIntyre opinions are an
important part of the jurisdictional corpus. The next three Parts of this Article

will examine these opinions in greater detail.
I.

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S MCINTYRE PLURALITY

While Justice Kennedy's reasoning appears to take the most restrictive
approach to jurisdiction of the three McIntyre opinions, it leaves many open
questions and should not necessarily be read to support significant new limits on

75. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Accordingly, on the record
present here, resolving this case requires no more than adhering to our precedents."); id. ("There
may well have been other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction.
And the dissent considers some of those facts. But the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
jurisdiction .... (citations omitted)).
76. Id. at 2791 (for a discussion of these facts see infra text accompanying note 193); see
also id. at 2792 ("There may well have been other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated
in support of jurisdiction. And the dissent considers some of those facts. [Id. at 2795-96
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting).] But the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, and here I
would take the facts precisely as the New Jersey Supreme Court stated them." (citing Ins. Corp. of
Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982); Blakey v. Continental Airlines,
Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 557 (N.J. 2000))).
77. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The American Distributor on one occasion sold and
shipped one machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer, Mr. Curcio."
(emphasis added) (citing Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578-79)); see also id. at 2792 (describing the
machine as "a single isolated sale"); id. (relying on the notion that "a single sale of a product in a
State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant"
(emphasis added)). ustice Ginsburg's dissent adds that "McIntyre UK resisted Nicastro's efforts to
determine whether other McIntyre machines had been sold to New Jersey customers," id. at 2797
n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting), citing to McIntyre UK's objections to interrogatories asking for
information about sales to New Jersey buyers, see Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 100a-101a.
79. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 2785 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
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the permissible scope of jurisdiction. Many of the principles on which Justice
Kennedy relies are not fundamentally inconsistent with a more lenient approach.
That said, it is difficult to draw coherent lessons from Justice Kennedy's opinion
because he fails to explain adequately why those basic principles dictate the
conclusion he reaches in McIntyre. The opinion is also perplexing for how it
handles some of the Court's prior opinions on personal jurisdiction, and because
of its failure to consider other opinions that conflict with some aspects of Justice
Kennedy's reasoning.
A.

Justice Kennedy's Basic Principles

Many of the basic principles that Justice Kennedy employs are fairly
uncontroversial and fully consistent with upholding jurisdiction in a case like
McIntyre. In particular, Justice Kennedy does not rule out the possibility that the
transmission of goods into the forum state can be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction. The requirement that a defendant must "purposefully avai[l] itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," 8he explains, can
be met by a defendant "sending its goods rather than its agents." '
Justice Kennedy clarifies that "[t]he defendant's transmission of goods
permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have
targeted the forum.
This is admittedly a new gloss on how to assess
jurisdiction in the stream of commerce scenario. 83 Whether it represents a
significant change, however, depends on what it means to target the forum.
Justice Kennedy does not provide much guidance on this critical question, but
what he does say is neither reactionary nor revolutionary. He argues, for
example, that "it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its
goods will reach the forum State." 84 This idea is nothing new. More than thirty
years ago, World-Wide Volkswagen dismissed the idea that jurisdiction is proper
merely because it was "foreseeable" that a defendant's product might enter the
forum and cause injury there. 85 Justice Kennedy also recognizes that jurisdiction
is appropriate over
a manufacturer or distributor who "'seek[s] to serve' a given
State's market., 86 In this sense, Justice Kennedy's basic principles are

81. Id. at 2788 (alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir.v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 704-05 (1982)).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer referred to this aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion as
a "strict no-jurisdiction rule." Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J. concurring).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (rejecting the
argument that "because an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose it was 'foreseeable'
that the Robinsons' Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma").
86. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444

U.S. at 295) ("[A] defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction without entering

2012]

EXAMINING THE THREE OPINIONS IN MCINTYRE

majority and by
consistent with those espoused by the World-Wide Volkswagen
87
both Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan in Asahi.
B. How Justice Kennedy Applies His Basic Principles

What is more difficult to understand from Justice Kennedy's opinion is why
the principles he endorses dictate his conclusion that J. McIntyre had not
targeted or sought to serve the New Jersey market. 88 In particular, Justice
Kennedy fails to confront this key question: Why is it not the case that a
manufacturer who seeks to serve the U.S. market as a whole necessarily seeks to
serve the states that comprise the United States? Justice Kennedy does write that
"personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign,
89
analysis," and that "the United States is a distinct sovereign."
The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct
directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a
given sovereign ....

...Here the question concerns the authority of a New Jersey state court
with
to exercise jurisdiction, so it is petitioner's purposeful contacts
90
relevant.
are
alone
that
States,
United
the
with
not
Jersey,
New
These observations do not resolve the issue, however. To emphasize
"conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a
given sovereign" does not prevent the conclusion that a defendant's conduct is
a
"directed at" the forum state when the defendant's conduct is directed at 91
territorial entity (such as the entire United States) that includes the forum state.
Indeed, a host of strange results would ensue if courts were to conclude that a
defendant does not seek to serve the forum state when it seeks to serve a
territorial area that includes the forum state. Suppose a defendant seeks to serve
the New York City tri-state area, which includes portions of Connecticut, New

the forum-itself an unexceptional proposition-as where manufacturers or distributors 'seek to
serve' a given State's market." (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295)).
87. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
88. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion) ("Respondent has not established
that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.").
89. Id. at 2789.
90. Id. at 2789-90 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("McIntyre UK dealt with the United
States as a single market. Like most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned not with the prospect
of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United
States.... McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its machines in the
United States, 'purposefully availed itself' of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a
single State or a discrete collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of
all States in which its products were sold by its exclusive distributor.").
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Jersey, and New York. Would a court following Justice Kennedy's logic have to
conclude that such a defendant has not targeted any of these three states? Or
suppose a defendant seeks to serve an area bounded by particular latitudes and
longitudes. If that area includes State X, would courts following Justice
Kennedy's approach have to conclude that the defendant is not targeting State X
because it has not explicitly defined its area of service with reference to that
state?
Justice Kennedy also writes: "At no time did [J. McIntyre] engage in any
activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the
protection of its laws." 9 But why is it not the case that J. McIntyre intended to
benefit from the protection of New Jersey law because (1) the larger U.S. market
that J. McIntyre targeted included New Jersey; and (2) the New Jersey market
exists because it is supported by an array of New Jersey laws, including New
Jersey's tort laws, that give its citizens confidence to engage in economic
activity knowing that they can seek compensation when other economic actors
breach their duties?
In addition, Justice Kennedy's opinion emphasizes the fact that the U.S.
trade shows attended by J. McIntyre officials were located in states other than
New Jersey. 93 Yet this fact cannot be dispositive either, because Justice
Kennedy himself instructs that jurisdiction can be appropriate even if the
defendant (or here, the defendant's officers or employees) never entered the
state. 94 A narrow focus on the particular states in which national trade shows
were held also seems to be in tension with Justice Kennedy's acknowledgement
that courts must consider "the economic realities of the market the defendant
seeks to serve" in examining the propriety of jurisdiction. 95 In an integrated
national economy like the United States, it is hard to imagine that trade shows
would be held in every single state in the union.
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg's dissent identifies several facts that would
seem to constitute relevant "economic realities," but Justice Kennedy does not
address them. For example, Justice Ginsburg notes the important role that the
annual industry trade show plays in the market for scrap metal processing and
recycling equipment. 96 J. McIntyre representatives attended these trade shows in

92. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 2790 ("J. McIntyre officials attended trade shows in several States but not in New
Jersey....").
94. Id. at 2788 (calling it an "unexceptional proposition" that "a defendant may in an
appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction without entering the forum").
95. Id. at 2790 ('The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment
depends on purposeful availment... does not by itself resolve many difficult questions of
jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases. The defendant's conduct and the economic realitiesof
the market the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial exposition will, in
common-law fashion, clarify the contours of that principle." (emphasis added)).
96. See id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[M]ore than 3,000 potential buyers of scrap
processing and recycling equipment attend its annual conventions, 'primarily because th[el
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the United States for sixteen consecutive years-including the year Mr.
Nicastro's employer attended the trade show and, as a result, purchased the
machine at issue.97 Close to 100 New Jersey businesses belonged to the industry
98
group that hosted the U.S. trade shows that J. McIntyre's officers attended.
Justice Ginsburg also notes that New Jersey had the fourth-highest overall share

of the U.S. import market for manufactured commodities. 9 With respect to
scrap metal in particular, New Jersey recycling facilities process over two
States, "outpacing
million tons annually, more than any other State in the United
't
percent."'
30
nearly
by
competitor,
nearest
its
Kentucky,

Justice Kennedy's opinion does not consider any of these facts in reaching
that New Jersey lacked jurisdiction. Perhaps he believed that the
conclusion
the

information Justice Ginsburg cites was not properly in the record. 01 Perhaps
these are not the sort of "economic realities" he has in mind. There is no way of
knowing from the opinion itself. Justice Kennedy does note that a maximum of
four J. McIntyre machines "ended up in New Jersey." 0 2 Putting aside the fact
that four machines would have a total value of around $100,000,103 perhaps

Justice Kennedy is suggesting that a small quantity of purchases by customers in
the forum is an "economic realit[y]"' 4 that weakens the case for jurisdiction. If
so, would he reach a different result if more of J. McIntyre's machines had

ultimately been purchased by New Jersey customers? Considering economic
realities might even support a more open-ended approach to minimum contacts
similar to the one alluded to by Justice Stevens in his enigmatic Asahi opinion.
"is affected by the
Justice Stevens wrote that the jurisdictional inquiry
105 volume,
,,
Justice
the value, and the hazardous character" of the relevant product.

exposition provides them with the most comprehensive industry-related shopping experience
concentrated in a single, convenient location."' (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 47a)).
97. See id. ("McIntyre UK representatives attended every ISRI convention from 1990
through 2005." (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 66, at 114a-115a)).
98. Id. atn.1.
99. Id. at 2799 n.6 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
U.S. INT'L TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVS. 37 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/Press-Release/current-press-release/ft900.pdf). This figure is from 2011.
100. See id. at 2795 (citing Rob van Haaren et al., The State of Garbage in America,
BIOCYCLE, Oct. 2010, at 16, 19 tbl.3, available at http://www.seas.columbia.edu/earth/wtert/sofos/
SOG2010.pdf). These figures are from 2008.
101. Justice Breyer, by contrast, made this point explicitly. See supra note 76.
102. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
103. See id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the shear machine at issue "sold in
the United States for $24,900 in 1995"); cf id. at 2803 n.15 ("The plurality notes the low volume of
sales in New Jersey. [Id. at 2786, 2790-91 (plurality opinion)]. A $24,900 shearing machine,
however, is unlikely to sell in bulk worldwide, much less in any given State. By dollar value, the
price of a single machine represents a significant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey
$24,900 worth of flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court would presumably
find the defendant amenable to suit in that State." (citations omitted)).
104. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
105. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in
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Kennedy's reference to economic realities is potentially an encouraging sign for
those who support a more flexible approach to jurisdiction, but it ultimately
yields more questions than answers.
C. Of Sovereignty and Submission

Justice Kennedy's McIntyre opinion also-raises questions because of two
features that are difficult to square with the Supreme Court's case law on
personal jurisdiction. One is his focus on sovereign power in examining the
constitutionality of a state court's exercise of jurisdiction. He writes:
[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-bysovereign, analysis. The question is whether a defendant has followed a
course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the
jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the
°6 power to

subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.

This emphasis on sovereignty is in tension with earlier Supreme Court
decisions rejecting the notion that constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction
07
derive from "an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court."'
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court

wrote: "The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a
10 8
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."'

deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful
availment' even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard product marketed
throughout the world.").
106. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
107. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982);
see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Kennedy's
emphasis on "sovereign authority" is inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions (citing
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.20 (1977)); Richard D. Freer, PersonalJurisdictionin the
Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 580 (2012)
("The Court rejected this notion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland ... ").
108. Ins. Corp. ofJr., 456 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's attempt to handle
InsuranceCorp. of Irelandis puzzling. He writes:
Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts "judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty,
but as a matter of individual liberty," for due process protects the individual's right to be
subject only to lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on
whether the sovereign has authority to render it.
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ins. Corp. of r., 456 U.S. at 702). As
explained below, whether we define jurisdictional limitations as a function of sovereignty or of
individual liberty might ultimately accomplish very little in terms of informing the ultimate content
of those limitations. See infra notes 115-119 and accompanying text. But if the distinction means
anything, it cannot be elided as easily as Justice Kennedy suggests. In essence, he claims
consistency with Insurance Corp. of Ireland by saying that the "individual liberty" interest is
defined by "whether the sovereign has authority to render [judgment]." J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at
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A second aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion is his insistence that
jurisdiction is appropriate only when a person "submi[ts] to a State's
authority. ' 1°9 Justice Kennedy writes that "[t]he principal inquiry," for purposes
of personal jurisdiction, "is whether the defendant's activities manifest an
intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.""1l0 This focus on "submission
to a State's powers" ' calls to mind the anachronistic view of jurisdiction that
the Court rejected nearly seven decades ago in International Shoe. Prior to

International Shoe, jurisdiction over defendants who were not present in the
State was often legitimized by the idea that their "consent to service and suit"
could be "implied" from their actions.

But InternationalShoe put to rest this

"legal fiction," recognizing instead that a defendant's "acts were of such a nature
as to justify the fiction."" 3 In developing the notion of "minimum contacts,"
InternationalShoe rejected a jurisdictional framework based on the defendant's
implied consent or submission to the state's authority. Yet Justice Kennedy
seems to embrace that long-discarded framework." 14
Justice Kennedy's invocation of sovereignty and submission makes it
difficult to discern confidently his jurisdictional philosophy. Does he truly
intend to break from decades of established precedent and to reconceptualize
personal jurisdiction?" t5 Or does he not appreciate the tension between his

reasoning and earlier decisions?

Ultimately, choosing to speak in terms of

2789 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702) (internal quotation marks
omitted). That, it seems, is to turn Insurance Corp. of Irelandon its head.
109. Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. (noting "a more limited
form of submission to a State's authority for disputes that 'arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state"' (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))); id.
(noting situations that "reveal[] circumstances, or a course of conduct, from which it is proper to
infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to the laws of the forum State").
110. Id. at 2788.
111. Id. at 2787 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2853-54 (2011)).
112. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing five previous Supreme Court cases that have used this
"legal fiction").
113. Id. at 318-19 (citing Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151
dissenting) ("[Iln InternationalShoe
(1915)); see also J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J.,
itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal fictions, notably 'presence' and
'implied consent,' should be discarded, for they conceal the actual bases on which jurisdiction
rests."); id. at 2799 ("[T]he Court has explained [that] a forum can exercise jurisdiction when its
contacts with the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has
repeatedly said, is unnecessary and unhelpful.").
114. See J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he plurality's notion
that consent is the animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court.");
id. at 2799 n.5 ("The plurality's notion that jurisdiction over foreign corporations depends upon the
defendant's 'submission,' seems scarcely different from the long-discredited fiction of implied
consent." (citation omitted)).
115. Although "stare decisis is not an inexorable command," Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citation omitted), to deviate from earlier holdings requires a
justification more compelling than "a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the
[earlier] Court," id. at 864.
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sovereignty or submission does not necessarily entail a substantive difference in
terms of the permissible scope of jurisdiction. Even if we accept the sovereignty
notion that Justice Kennedy articulates, we are still left with the question of
precisely when "a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the
society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign.""' To
emphasize sovereignty does not, in and of itself, foreclose the conclusion that a
defendant's conduct is directed at the forum state when its conduct is directed at
a territorial entity (such as the entire United States) that includes the forum
state.' 17
Similarly, the desirability of inquiring whether a defendant has "submit[ted]
to the power of a sovereign"" 8 depends entirely on what sort of conduct by a
defendant is deemed to constitute submission to that power. In fact, most of
Justice Kennedy's more general articulations of what will constitute such
submission are uncontroversial and consistent with past precedent.119 As with a
focus on sovereignty, a focus on submission is fully reconcilable with the idea
that a defendant submits to a state's jurisdiction when it seeks to serve a broader
market that encompasses that state. My point here is not that sovereignty and
submission are necessarily undesirable concepts (although given their current
state of refinement they do not seem to be particularly helpful). It is rather that
Justice Kennedy embraces these ideas without adequately confronting their
tension with prior Supreme Court case law.
D. Justice Brennan's Asahi Opinion

Another puzzling aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion is his discussion of
Justice Brennan's Asahi concurrence. Justice Kennedy critiques Justice Brennan
for "discard[ing] the central concept of sovereign authority in favor of
considerations of fairness and foreseeability. ° According to Justice Kennedy,
Justice Brennan's "premise" in Asahi was "that the defendant's ability to
anticipate suit renders the assertion of jurisdiction
fair," which thereby "made
2
foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction."' '1

116. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
117. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
118. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
119. See supra Part II.A; see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (plurality opinion)
(noting "a more limited form of submission to a State's authority for disputes that 'arise out of or
are connected with the activities within the state,"' which includes the situation "where
manufacturers or distributors 'seek to serve' a given State's market" (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945))); id. at 2787 ("Citizenship or domicile-or, by analogy, incorporation or principal
place of business for corporations-also indicates general submission to a State's powers." (citing
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011))).
120. J.McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
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It is odd for Justice Kennedy to treat fairness and foreseeability as
considerations that are exclusive to Justice Brennan's Asahi concurrence.
Supreme Court decisions as old as International Shoe (and even older) have

tethered the propriety of jurisdiction to whether "maintenance of the suit [would]
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' ' ' 122 And it was
the World-Wide Volkswagen majority that endorsed foreseeability as relevant to
According to World-Wide Volkswagen, it
the constitutionality of jurisdiction.
was "critical to due process analysis" that "the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."'124 Indeed, that is precisely how Justice Brennan

used the idea of foreseeability in his Asahi concurrence. Quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen verbatim, Justice Brennan wrote:

[T]his is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant.
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
State are such
25
Court there.1
One could certainly make the case that fairness and foreseeability are not

particularly useful concepts for defining the permissible scope of personal
jurisdiction. Fairness is a notoriously imprecise standard. And there is
potentially a circular quality to the idea that jurisdiction must be foreseeable in
the sense that defendants "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in
the forum state. 126 It is, after all, the jurisdictional principles themselves that

would make jurisdiction foreseeable.12

For better or worse, however, these

122. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); id. at
320 ("It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the
forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there."
(emphasis added)); see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ('The modem
approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by InternationalShoe,
gave prime place to reason and fairness.").
123. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ('This is not to
say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant.").
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 119 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
127. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1134 (1981) ("[A] potential defendant can only
have such an expectation because the law so provides."). If applied unthinkingly, a focus on
foreseeability could yield problematic results at both ends of the jurisdictional spectrum. At one
extreme, it could legitimate a state's plainly exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction so long as the state's
law was clear enough to give defendants notice of its desired jurisdictional scope. At the other
extreme, it could foreclose any evolution of jurisdictional principles; International Shoe's
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ideas have been part of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. If Justice
Kennedy believes that these are improper considerations, then it is he-not
Justice Brennan-who would "discard[] the central concept[s]' ' 128 of existing
doctrine. Does Justice Kennedy truly wish the sort of jurisprudential rewiring
that his attack on fairness and foreseeability suggests, or does his opinion simply
misperceive existing case law?
E. Justice O'Connor'sAsahi Opinion

Another difficult aspect of Justice Kennedy's McIntyre opinion is its
relationship to Justice O'Connor's approach to minimum contacts in Asahi.
Justice Kennedy claims that his opinion is "consistent with Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Asahi."'' 29 And indeed, both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
embrace the principle that a defendant establishes the requisite contacts with the
forum when it "seek[s] to serve" the market in the forum state. 130 It should be
emphasized, however, that Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Asahi does not reject
the idea that a defendant who seeks to serve the U.S. market as a whole also
seeks to serve the individual states that comprise the U.S. market. In fact, lower
court decisions that Justice O'Connor cited favorably in her Asahi opinion
adopted precisely this approach.
In concluding that Asahi had not "designed its product in anticipation of
sales in California,"' 31 Justice O'Connor compared the facts of Asahi to
Rockwell International Corp. v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, a

federal district court case.' 32 The defendant in Rockwell International was
SNFA, a French corporation that manufactured ball-bearing assemblies designed
to be used in a particular helicopter called the A-109.1
SNFA sold these
assemblies to its Italian subsidiary, which sold them to the Italian helicopter
manufacturer (Agusta), which then incorporated the bearings into its A-109

recognition that an absent defendant can be subject to jurisdiction if it establishes minimum contacts
with the forum state, Int'l Shoe,,326 U.S. at 316, would have foundered on the argument that such a
defendant could not have "reasonably anticipate[dj being haled into Court" on that basis, WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
128. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 2790.
130. Id. at 2788 ("[A] defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction without
entering the forum-itself an unexceptional proposition-as where manufacturers or distributors
'seek to serve' a given State's market." (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295)); Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1980) (O'Connor, J.) (noting that
jurisdiction is proper when the defendant's conduct "indicate[s] an intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum State").
131. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (O'Connor, J.).
132. Id. (citing Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553 F.
Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
133. Rockwell Int'l, 553 F. Supp. at 329.
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helicopters.' 34 Agusta then sold the helicopters to a U.S. distributor in Delaware
that would, in turn, sell to consumers in the United States. 135
Even though SNFA played no role in distributing the finished helicopters in
the United States (much less distributing them in particular states within the
United States), jurisdiction was appropriate in Pennsylvania because SNFA had
purposefully designed its bearing assemblies for use in the A-109 helicopter and
"was aware that the A-109 helicopter was targeted for the executive corporate
transport market in the United States and Europe."' 36 The district court
explained: "Given the distribution system, SNFA had ample reason to know and
expect that its bearing, as a unique part of a larger product, would' 37be marketed in
any or all states, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." 1
Similarly, Justice O'Connor cited the federal district court decision in Hicks
v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries.13

Unlike in Hicks, Justice O'Connor noted,

Asahi "did not create, control, or employ the distribution system that brought its"
product to the forum. 139 In Hicks, a Japanese motorcycle manufacturer
established minimum contacts with Pennsylvania even though it did not sell its
products to particular consumers in Pennsylvania or other U.S. states; rather, the
Japanese manufacturer-like the British manufacturer in McIntyre-sold its
products destined for the U.S. market only to its U.S. distributor.140 The court in
Hicks reasoned that "[t]he manufacturer has the minimum contacts [with
Pennsylvania] required by due process and is doing business by means of
indirect shipments of goods into the state."' 141 It was irrelevant, therefore, that
"the product was not directly placed in the state by [the Japanese manufacturer],
but rather was marketed by one whom the [manufacturer] could foresee would
cause the product to enter Pennsylvania."' 142 It was also not necessary to show
that the Japanese manufacturer had exercised "corporate control" over its U.S.
distributor. 143 The Hicks court concluded that to deny jurisdiction "would permit

a foreign corporation to market its product in this state, profit from its sale here
and yet retain immunity simply by structuring its business operations so as to
avoid direct activity in the Commonwealth."'"

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 330-32.
137. Id. at 333.
138. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987) (O'Connor, J.)
(citing Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa. 1978)).
139. Id. (citing Hicks, 452 F. Supp. 130).
140. Hicks, 452 F. Supp. at 132, 134 (citing Kitzinger v. Gimbel Bros., 368 A.2d 333 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1976)).
141. Id. at 134 (emphasis added) (citing Kitzinger, 368 A.2d 333).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 134-35 (noting that the court didn't need to decide whether the Japanese
manufacturer had corporate control over their United States distributor, as they had already found
personal jurisdiction).
144. Id. at 134 (citing Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Berslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.
Pa. 1975)).
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Justice O'Connor's citations to these cases reveal that, under her approach,
endeavors to serve the U.S. market generally can indeed constitute purposeful

efforts to serve the individual states that comprise the United States. 45 Justice
Kennedy's ultimate conclusion in McIntyre appears to be in tension with this
idea, even though he endorses Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Ashai.
F. Empty Rhetoric?

There are a few parts of Justice Kennedy's opinion that seem more rhetorical
than substantive, but they are worth recognizing. One is Justice Kennedy's
challenge to what he calls the "the stream-of-commerce metaphor"; he writes
that "the stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the mandate of
146
the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures.
That may be true, but it sheds no light on the key question of what "the mandate
of the Due Process Clause" actually is. As discussed above, Justice Kennedy

himself recognizes that due process can be satisfied by a defendant "sending its
goods rather than its agents," such as when a defendant "'seek[s] to serve' a
given State's market."' Labeling the stream of commerce a mere "metaphor"
does not dictate any particular answer to what the Due Process Clause requires in
cases like McIntyre.

Similar in this regard is Justice Kennedy's comment that "it is the
defendant's actions, not his expectations, that empower a State's courts to
subject him to judgment. ' Justice Kennedy makes this statement during his
critique of Justice Brennan's Asahi opinion, but Justice Kennedy's doctrinal

point is unclear. The only time Justice Brennan used the word "expectation" in
his Asahi opinion was when he stated, quoting verbatim from World-Wide

145. Although Justice O'Connor found that Asahi had not established minimum contacts with
California, Asahi was a component manufacturer who played no role at all in defining where the
finished tire tubes manufactured in Taiwan would be sold. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) ("[Asahi] did not create, control, or employ the
distribution system that brought its valves to California."). Under the logic of Justice O'Connor's
opinion, one might say that such a component manufacturer acts to serve the needs of the finishedproduct manufacturer in Taiwan, not the market where the finished product is ultimately purchased.
J. McIntyre, on the other hand, took numerous purposeful steps to access the U.S. market. See
supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,
2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Asahi, unlike McIntyre UK, did not itself seek out customers in
the United States, it engaged no distributor to promote its wares here, it appeared at no tradeshows
in the United States, and, of course, it had no Web site advertising its products to the world.
Moreover, Asahi was a component-part manufacturer with 'little control over the final destination
of its products once they were delivered into the stream of commerce."' (quoting A. Uberti & C. v.
Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1361 (Ariz. 1995))).
146. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion).
147. Id. at 2788 (citation omitted) ("[A] defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to
jurisdiction without entering the forum-itself an unexceptional proposition-as where
manufacturers or distributors 'seek to serve' a given State's market." (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980))).
148. Id. at 2789.
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Volkswagen, that "[tihe forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State."' 149 Contrary to Justice Kennedy's
suggestion, this principle is not one that would vest jurisdiction based on a

defendant's "expectations" alone.150 When a defendant "delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State," ' 5' jurisdiction is based on an action
("deliver[ing] its products into the stream of commerce") that is taken with a
particular expectation ("that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State"). Accordingly, Justice Kennedy's quip that jurisdiction must be based on
actions rather than expectations does little more than attack a doctrinal straw
man; it does not meaningfully clarify his approach to personal jurisdiction.
Finally, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion asserts that "[flreeform notions
of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a
judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law."' 52 Insofar as this
comment fails to clarify the circumstances in which there is such an "absence of
authority," it also appears to be mere rhetorical flourish. It would certainly be
wrong to say that jurisdiction may never expand beyond "traditional practice."
If so, InternationalShoe's recognition that an absent defendant can be subject to
jurisdiction if it establishes "minimum contacts"
53 with the forum state would have
failed as contrary to then-traditional practice.
In any event, it is unclear whom Justice Kennedy himself is "target[ing]"
with his critique of "[f]reeform notions of fundamental fairness."' 54 Justice
Ginsburg's dissent does not propose that jurisdiction should be acceptable as
long as it comports with freeform notions of fundamental fairness. Justice
Ginsburg does recognize that "[t]he modem approach to jurisdiction over
corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave
prime place to reason andfairness." 55 But it was hardly her view that "fairness"
alone (much less "[flreeform ...fairness") ought to be the test for jurisdiction.

Rather, Justice Ginsburg employs the same "purposeful availment" test that

149. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119-20 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 298).
150. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
151. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
152. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion).
153. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct.
at 2800 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the plurality's objection to "a jurisdictional approach
'divorced from traditional practice' and responding that "'the fundamental transformation of our
national economy,' this Court has recognized, warrants enlargement of 'the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents' (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957))).
154. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2787-88 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Justice Kennedy
insists is the "general rule" for a "sovereign's exercise of
56
power."'
IV. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S MCINTYRE DISSENT

Justice Ginsburg authors a dissenting opinion in McIntyre, joined by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan.1 57 Justice Ginsburg's dissent does not disagree with the
basic premise that a defendant must "purposefully avail[] itself' of the forum
state in order to be subject to jurisdiction there. 158 She concludes, however, that
J. McIntyre unquestionably did so with respect to New Jersey. Justice Ginsburg
writes (referring to J. McIntyre as "McIntyre UK"):
McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its
machines in the United States, "purposefully availed itself' of the
United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a
discrete collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the
market of all States in which its products were sold by its exclusive
distributor.' 59
She further explains:
McIntyre UK's regular attendance and exhibitions at ISRI conventions
[in the United States] was surely a purposeful step to reach customers
for its products "anywhere in the United States." At least as purposeful
was McIntyre UK's engagement of McIntyre America as the conduit for
sales of McIntyre UK's machines to buyers "throughout the United
States." Given McIntyre UK's endeavors to reach and profit from the
United States market as a whole, Nicastro's suit, I would hold, has been
brought in a forum entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his
claim.... The machine arrived in Nicastro's New Jersey workplace not
randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and
distribution system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged. On what
sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory authority could the place
of Nicastro's injury within the United States be deemed off limits for his
products liability claim against a foreign manufacturer who targeted the

156. Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion); see infra text accompanying notes 158-160 (describing
Justice Ginsburg's application of the purposeful availment standard). Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg disagree, of course, about what result that test commanded in McIntyre.
157. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2801 (noting "[t]he 'purposeful availment' requirement" (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
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United States (including all the
States that constitute the Nation) as the
16
0
develop?
to
sought
it
territory
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg criticizes "the splintered majority" for
"turn[ing] the clock back to the days before modem long-arm statutes when a
manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only
Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market
it.'' 16 1 She also observes that the McIntyre decision "puts United States plaintiffs
at a disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants elsewhere in
the world," particularly in Europe. 162 She explains:
[W]ithin the European Union, in which the United Kingdom is a
participant, the jurisdiction New Jersey would have exercised is not at
all exceptional. The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the exercise of
specific jurisdiction "in matters relating to tort.., in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred." The European Court of
Justice has interpreted this prescription to authorize jurisdiction
either
163
where the harmful act occurred or at the place of injury.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent concludes by endorsing the following
jurisdictional rule: when "a local plaintiff [is] injured by the activity of a
manufacturer seeking to exploit a multistate or global market. . jurisdiction is
appropriately exercised by courts of the place where the product was sold and
caused injury. '" 164 She indicates, however, that this principle could be limited to
"cases involving a substantially local plaintiff, like Nicastro, injured by the
activity of a defendant engaged in interstate or international trade. ' ' 65 Thus,
jurisdiction might not be proper if "the defendant is a natural or legal person

whose economic activities and legal involvements are largely home-based, i.e.,
entities without designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant

160. Id. at 2797 (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 2795 (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction
Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 531, 555 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 2803.
163. Id. at 2803-04 (footnote omitted) (quoting Council Regulation 44/2001, on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L
12) 4) (citing Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1748-49,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=CELEX:61976CJ0021:EN:
PDF); see also id. at 2804 n.17 (citing Weintraub, supra note 161, at 550-54) (citing as a reference
"[f]or a concise comparison of the European regime and this Court's decisions").
164. Id. at 2804.
165. Id.
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markets."' 66 This suggests an approach that would "[assign[]
weight to the
67
local or international stage on which the parties operate."'
This aspect of Justice Ginsburg's opinion-how to measure and to account
for the "local or international stage on which the parties operate"168 -could
potentially raise important questions going forward. Justice Ginsburg also does
not indicate how this consideration ought to be situated within the two-prong
jurisdictional analysis that the Supreme Court articulated during the 1980s. This
well-known framework provides that first, the defendant must "purposefully
establish[] 'minimum contacts' in the forum State" and second, "these contacts
may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of
-,169
personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.
Factors relevant to the second prong include "the burden on the defendant, the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest
70
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.",
Doctrinally, Justice Ginsburg's concern for "the defendant... whose
economic activities and legal involvements are largely home-based '' 171 might be
vindicated under either of the two prongs. One could argue under the first prong
that such a defendant-who lacks "designs to gain substantial revenue from sales
'
those markets. Therefore, it
in distant markets"' 72 -does not "seek to serve"173
has not purposefully established minimum contacts with them. Other aspects of
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, however, frame this concern with language that
resonates more with the second prong of the standard jurisdictional analysis.
The distinction between "a defendant engaged in... international trade" and one
"whose economic activities and legal involvements are largely home-based"
seems to derive from the role that "considerations of litigational convenience and
the respective situations of the parties" play in "determin[ing] when it is

166. Id. (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1167-69 (1966)).
167. Id. at 2804 n.18.
168. Id.
169. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945)); see also supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
170. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2788 (plurality opinion) ("[A] defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to
jurisdiction without entering the forum-itself an unexceptional proposition-as where
manufacturers or distributors 'seek to serve' a given State's market." (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295)); see also supra note 59 (discussing Justice O'Connor's and Justice
Brennan's opinions in Asahi, which recognized that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by
seeking to serve the market in the forum state).
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appropriate to subject a defendant to trial in the plaintiffs community."' 174 Such
considerations have traditionally been addressed at the second step of75 the

prevailing jurisdictional framework (the reasonableness or fairness prong).'

Justice Ginsburg's McIntyre dissent may ultimately reflect an approach to

jurisdiction that does not draw such a stark boundary between the two inquiries
that crystallized during the 1980s. Recognizing that "[t]he modem approach to

jurisdiction over corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by
InternationalShoe, gave prime place to reason and fairness,"'17776 Justice Ginsburg
I

seamlessly presents arguments that sound in both the first and the second'
prongs. Indeed, some commentators have argued in favor of a less-regimented

approach.179 Such an approach might also find support in the Burger King
decision. Although Burger King was arguably the first Supreme Court case to
explicitly disentangle the two inquiries, it suggested that there ought to be some
interplay between the two. The Court noted that the second-prong factors might

"sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
180
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."'

Conversely, "where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at

forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case

174. Id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 166, at
1166-69).
175. See supra text accompanying note 170 (listing factors relevant to the reasonableness of
jurisdiction).
176. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 2801 ("McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market ....
McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all States in which its products were sold by its
exclusive distributor.").
178. See id. at 2800 (arguing that "litigational convenience and choice-of-law considerations
point in [the] direction" of "requir[ing] the international seller to defend at the place its products
cause injury"); id. at 2800-01 ("Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e.,
a reasonable cost of transacting business internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to
go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using McIntyre's product
at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New Jersey?").
179. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers"for International Shoe (and None for Asahi):
An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 755, 758-59
(1995) (arguing that it was "troublesome" for the Court to "introduce[] an additional layer of
analysis-a 'reasonableness' standard-to International Shoe's 'minimum contacts' and arguing
that the minimum contacts test itself should be "understood ...to require that the defendant's
activities in the state be balanced against the state's regulatory and litigation interests-hence the
requirement that the defendant have 'certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"'). It is harder to tell
how the other six McIntyre Justices feel about the two-pronged approach. As a logical matter, there
was no need for either Justice Kennedy or Justice Breyer to confront the reasonableness or fairness
factors, because they had each concluded that J. McIntyre had not purposefully established
minimum contacts with New Jersey, which is the first requirement of the traditional test. See Linda
J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and Comparative
Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REv. 591, 595 (2012).
180. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable."'81
V. JUSTICE BREYER'S MCINTYRE CONCURRENCE

Justices Breyer and Alito join neither Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion
nor Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in McIntyre.' 82 They do concur in the
ultimate result reached by the plurality, thus providing the fifth and sixth votes
against allowing the New Jersey court to exercise jurisdiction in McIntyre. But
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion explicitly rejects the reasoning put forward
by Justice Kennedy. In particular, Justice Breyer's opinion challenges Justice
Kennedy's use of "strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not
'inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign' and cannot 'be said to have
targeted the forum."' 183 Rather, Justice Breyer recognizes (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen) that jurisdiction would have been proper if J. McIntyre had
"delivered its goods in the stream of commerce
'with the expectation that they
84
will be purchased' by New Jersey users."''
In concluding that jurisdiction was not proper in McIntyre, Justice Breyer
emphasizes that J. McIntyre's U.S. distributor "on one occasion sold and shipped
one machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer, Mr.
Curcio."' 185 He then writes that prior Supreme Court decisions "strongly
suggest[] that a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate
basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that
defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping)
that such a sale will take place."' 186 However, Justice Breyer does not
acknowledge a significant tension between his "single sale" idea and the Court's
decision in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 187 McGee upheld
jurisdiction in California even though the defendant had "never solicited or
done
188
any insurance business in California apartfrom the policy involved here."'

181. Id.
182. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 2793 (quoting id. at 2788 (plurality opinion)).
184. Id. at 2792 (rejecting jurisdiction because Nicastro "has not otherwise shown that the
British Manufacturer 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities' within
New Jersey, or that it delivered its goods in the stream of commerce 'with the expectation that they
will be purchased' by New Jersey users" (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98)).
185. Id. at 2791 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 2792.
187. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
188. Id. at 222 (emphasis added). It is puzzling that Justice Breyer relies on World-Wide

Volkswagen as a "previous holding[]" that "suggest[s]" that a single sale in the forum in
insufficient. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286). As Justice Breyer recognizes, World-Wide Volkswagen involved "a
single sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a different State (where the
accident takes place)." Id. (emphasis added). It was not a case where the defendant's product was
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In addition, Justice Breyer's concurrence fails to make a clear connection
between some of the underlying jurisdictional principles and the result he
reaches. Again, Justice Breyer accepts that jurisdiction would be proper if J.
McIntyre had "delivered its goods in the stream of commerce 'with the
expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey users." 1 89 However, he
does not explain why such an expectation is lacking when a defendant like J.
McIntyre retains a U.S. distributor for the express purpose of accessing the U.S.
market as a whole. The purpose of such an arrangement is to make sales within
the territory that comprises the United States, territory that includes New Jersey.
This idea is at the heart of Justice Ginsburg's dissent,' and it is significant that
Justice Breyer does not call Justice Ginsburg's legal reasoning into question.'91
His only critique of Justice Ginsburg's approach is that she considers
information beyond,192as he put it, "the facts precisely as the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated them."'
These aspects of Justice Breyer's concurring opinion prompt several
significant questions, some of which are examined in the following two sections.
Section A proposes one understanding of Justice Breyer's opinion that can
explain why he reaches Justice Kennedy's result but rejects Justice Kennedy's
reasoning, and why he disagrees with Justice Ginsburg's result but does not
challenge the legal principles Justice Ginsburg employs. Section B then
considers potential implications of Justice Breyer's concurrence going forward.
A.

Situating Justice Breyer's Concurrence

One way to make sense of Justice Breyer's opinion is to focus on that single
point on which he explicitly disagrees with Justice Ginsburg-the factual record.
Justice Breyer's conclusion in McIntyre is based on a narrow view of that record.

both purchased in the forum and caused injury there. See id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Jurisdiction, the [World-Wide Volkswagen] Court held, could not be based on the customer's
unilateral act of driving the vehicle to Oklahoma." (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
298)).
189. See supra text accompanying note 184.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 159-160 & 164; see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at
2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market. Like
most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to
State Y, but rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States.").
191. Justice Breyer does reject what he calls the "absolute approach adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court and urged by respondent and his amici." J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793
(Breyer, J., concurring). He explains: "Under that view, a producer is subject to jurisdiction for a
products-liability action so long as it 'knows or reasonably should know that its products are
distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in
any of the fifty states."' Id. (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 592
(N.J. 2010), rev'd, J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780). Notably, Justice Breyer does not attribute this
"absolute approach" to Justice Ginsburg.
192. Id. at 2792 (citations omitted).
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He proceeds on the assumption that the only facts offered in support of
jurisdiction were these:
(1) The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one
machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer,
Mr. Curcio; (2) the British Manufacturer permitted, indeed wanted, its
independent American Distributor to sell its machines to anyone in
America willing to buy them; and (3) representatives of the British
Manufacturer attended trade shows in "such cities as Chicago,
Las
9
Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San Francisco."1 W
What is so telling about Justice Breyer's recounting of the factual record in
McIntyre is that it excises J. McIntyre's overarching purpose of accessing the
entire U.S. market for its products. Whereas Justice Ginsburg saw a defendant
who "engaged" a U.S. distributor in order "to promote and sell its machines in
the United States,"' 194 and who took "purposeful step[s] to reach customers for its
products anywhere in the United States, '' 95 Justice Breyer saw a defendant who
passively "permitted" and "wanted" such sales to occur. 196 With the record

framed as Justice Breyer does, it is hard to see how a jurisdictional standard that
hinges on a defendant's "purpose[]'1 97 could ever be satisfied.
Justice Breyer's view of the factual record also explains how he is able to
reach the conclusion that J. McIntyre had not even "delivered its goods in the
stream of commerce 'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by New
Jersey users."' 98 In this regard, much can be learned from what Justice Breyer
notes was missing from the factual record. Specifically, Justice Breyer indicates
that a different result could be justified if the record contained a "list of potential
New Jersey customers who might... have regularly attended [the] trade shows"
that J. McIntyre officials attended; 99 if the record had contained evidence of "the
size and scope of New Jersey's scrap-metal business"; 200 or if the record
revealed more than a single sale to a single New Jersey customer. 201

193. Id. at 2791 (quoting Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578-79); see also id. (calling these the "three
primary facts" on which the New Jersey Supreme Court "relied most heavily").
194. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2797.
196. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
197. Id. at 2793 (noting the "constitutional demand for 'minimum contacts' and 'purposefu[1]
avail[ment]' (alterations in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291,297)).
198. Id. at 2792 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
199. Id. ("He has introduced no list of potential New Jersey customers who might, for
example, have regularly attended trade shows."); cf. id. at 2796 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
a 2011 member directory listing nearly 100 New Jersey businesses as belonging to the industry
group that sponsored the trade shows).
200. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting these as "other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have
demonstrated in support of jurisdiction"); cf id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing van
Haaren, supra note 100, at 19 tbl. 3) (using 2008 data on scrap metal recycling in New Jersey,

2012]

EXAMINING THE THREE OPINIONS IN MCINTYRE

In recognizing that these facts could tip the scale in favor of jurisdiction,
Justice Breyer's opinion can be reconciled with Justice Ginsburg's idea that

minimum contacts are established when a defendant "seek[s] to exploit a
multistate or global market" that includes the forum state.

202

Justice Breyer's

logic would merely require a showing that potential customers were likely to
exist in the forum state. 20 3 If the Mclntyre record had contained (in Justice
Breyer's words) a "list of potential New Jersey customers who might.., have

regularly attended [the] trade shows" that J. McIntyre officials attended, 204 or
evidence of "the size and scope of New Jersey's scrap-metal business, 2

5

then

that could create an expectation of purchases by New Jersey consumers. Either
fact would confirm--even before any sales were made-that there was a

potential market for J. McIntyre's products in New Jersey. Even without such
facts, however, the consummation of an actual sale to a New Jersey customer
would create that expectation going forward. 206 At that point, J. McIntyre either

would know or should know of the potential New Jersey market for its
machines. 207 Once an "expectation" of purchases by New Jersey users exists, the

act of "delivering its goods in the stream of commerce" could be sufficient to
establish minimum contacts if its goods are then purchased in New Jersey and
cause injury there. 208 For Justice Breyer, however, no such expectation is

indicating that New Jersey facilities processed over two million tons of scrap metal in 2008, which
was the largest of all the states by a substantial margin).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186.
202. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
203. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
204. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra note 199 and
accompanying text.
205. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra note 200.
206. Although Justice Breyer notes that "the relevant facts found by the New Jersey Supreme
Court show 'no regular. . . flow' or 'regular course' of sales in New Jersey," J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct.
at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring), he does not state that such a "regular flow" is required for
jurisdiction to be proper. A regular flow or course of sales in New Jersey would have been
sufficient for jurisdiction, see id., but Justice Breyer makes clear that Mr. Nicastro might also have
"otherwise shown that the British Manufacturer... delivered its goods in the stream of commerce
'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey users." Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
207. Accordingly, such additional facts would justify jurisdiction without adopting the
"absolute approach" that Justice Breyer rejects. See id. at 2793. Under that approach, "a producer
is subject to jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it 'knows or reasonably should
know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to
those products being sold in any of the fifty states."' Id. (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery
Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010), rev'd, J. McIntyre, 131 S,Ct. 2780). Facts confirming
the existence of actual or potential customers in the forum create an "expectation that [the
defendant's products] will be purchased" by users in the forum, id. at 2792 (internal quotation
marks omitted), rather than the mere speculation that a distribution system "might lead to those
products being sold in any of the fifty states," id. at 2793 (citation omitted).
208. See supra text accompanying note 184. Justice Breyer's concurrence, therefore, should
not be read as endorsing a strict rule that jurisdiction is never proper when only a single sale is made
to an in-forum purchaser. If an expectation of in-forum purchases is shown by other evidence, see
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created when (1) there is only a single sale of the defendant's product to a
customer in the forum state, and (2) there is no other evidence in the record
suggesting potential customers in the forum state.
One can envision situations where some facts of the sort Justice Breyer
identifies would be necessary to create a true expectation of purchases by
customers in the forum state. Consider, for example, scenarios where a
defendant seeks to access the U.S. market as a whole but, as a practical matter,
the market for the defendant's products exists only in some states (and not
others). A manufacturer of grapefruit-harvesting equipment might engage a
distributor to access the entire U.S. market, but that would not necessarily create
an expectation of purchases by users in Alaska, North Dakota, or other states
where grapefruit are not harvested. A manufacturer of cross-country skis might
engage a distributor to access the entire U.S. market, but that would not
necessarily create an expectation of purchases by users in Florida, Hawaii, or
other states where cross-country skiing does not take place.
This is not to say that the machinery at issue in McIntyre presented such a
scenario. But if we accept the premise that the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 2°9 one might need some
evidence to confirm that a potential market exists in the particular state within
the United States that seeks to exercise jurisdiction. Such evidence would
support the conclusion that the defendant delivered its goods in the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by customers in the
forum state. 210 This sort of approach is not fundamentally inconsistent with the
approach outlined by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. It would simply require a
slightly more robust factual record than Justice Breyer believed was present in
McIntyre.
B. Implications of Justice Breyer's Concurrence

This Article examines the potential implications of Justice Breyer's
concurrence in two ways. One is what it reveals about how Justices Breyer and
Alito would confront jurisdictional issues in future cases. Another is its likely
impact on lower courts-state and federal-going forward. On the first issue,

supra text accompanying notes 204-205, then jurisdiction might be proper even if only a single sale
is ultimately made. This understanding also reconciles Justice Breyer's concurrence with McGee.
See supra text accompanying notes 186-188. The defendant in McGee had only a single customer
in the forum (California), but it had a direct relationship with that customer and was unquestionably
aware that it was providing life insurance to a California purchaser during the course of that
relationship.
209. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982)
(noting the plaintiffs "burden of proof' with respect to personal jurisdiction). But see John Vail,
Six Questions in Light of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REv. 517 (2012)
(arguing that the defendant should bear the burden of proving that a state court's assertion of

jurisdiction is unconstitutional).
210. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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the most significant aspect of Justice Breyer's opinion may be that he and Justice
Alito express a willingness, in some future case, to hit the reset button on
existing jurisdictional doctrine. Provided they are able to obtain "a better
understanding of the relevant contemporary commercial circumstances," they are
potentially open to a "change in present law., 211 In particular, they recognize
that "there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication"notably the development of the internet-that "are not anticipated by our
precedents. ,,212 Justices Breyer and Alito are also keen to learn the U.S.
government's views on these issues, noting that the U.S. Solicitor General did

not participate in McIntyre.213
It would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that Justices Breyer and Alito

would necessarily follow the logic of their McIntyre concurrence when the next

case on personal jurisdiction reaches the Supreme Court. We do have a sense,
however, that Justices Breyer and Alito are concerned about the effect of a more
expansive approach to jurisdiction on smaller manufacturers: "[Mlanufacturers
come in many shapes and sizes. It may be fundamentally unfair to require a
small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan
coffee farmer, selling its products through international distributors, to respond
to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United
,,214
This concern could be vindicated, of course, along the lines that
States ....

211. J. Mcntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). As discussed supra note 115,
changing jurisdictional doctrine in some future case would require a justification more compelling
than "a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the [earlier] Court." Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992). The sorts of considerations identified by
Justice Breyer, however, are consistent with those that could support a reexamination of prior law.
See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I do not doubt that there have been
many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our
precedents."); id. at 2794 (expressing a desire for "a better understanding of the relevant
contemporary commercial circumstances ...[i]nsofar as such considerations are relevant to any
change in present law"); PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. at 855 (noting that a reexamination of prior
doctrine is justified when "premises of fact have so far changed ...as to render it[] ... somehow
irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed").
212. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2793 (criticizing Justice
Kennedy's jurisdictional standards by asking "what do those standards mean when a company
targets the world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of shipping
the products directly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com)
who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets its products through
popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum?").
213. Id. at 2794 (noting that "such considerations... might be presented in a case (unlike the
present one) in which the Solicitor General participates" and recognizing that the Solicitor General
participated in the Goodyear case, but declined an invitation at oral argument to give its views on
McIntyre.).
214. Id. Justice Breyer's concurrence expresses similar concern for smaller domestic
manufacturers who are sued "in a distant State." Id. at 2793 ("What might appear fair in the case of
a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its
product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, an
Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who
resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).").
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Justice Ginsburg suggests in her McIntyre dissent, 21 5 or more generally by using
the reasonableness prong 216 of the Court's jurisdictional doctrine to protect the
smaller manufacturers identified by Justice Breyer.
Whatever ultimately transpires in future Supreme Court cases, Justice
Breyer's concurrence may play a significant role in state courts and the lower
federal courts because of what is known as the Marks rule. In Marks v. United

States,217 the Supreme Court wrote that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
' 21 8
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. '
Although the contours of the Marks rule are murky in some regards, 219 Marks
certainly means that Justice Kennedy's four-Justice plurality would not
constitute the Supreme Court's holding in McIntyre. If any opinion qualifies
under Marks as the one "concurr[ing] . . 22. on the narrowest grounds, ' 22° it would
seem to be Justice Breyer's concurrence. 1
If state and lower federal courts look to Justice Breyer's concurrence as the

McIntyre holding under the Marks rule, they should recognize the points
described above as crucial features of that holding: (1) Justice Breyer recognizes
the principle articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen-that jurisdiction is proper
when a manufacturer or distributor "deliver[s] its goods in the stream of
commerce 'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by [forum-state]
users" ;222 (2) Justice Breyer rejects Justice Kennedy's "strict rules that limit

215. See id. at 2804 n.18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Assigning weight to the local or
international stage on which the parties operate would, to a considerable extent, answer the concerns
expressed by Justice Breyer."); see supra text accompanying notes 164-167 (describing this part of
Justice Ginsburg's dissent).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
217. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
218. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
219. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (stating that the Marks test "is
more easily stated than applied to the various [Supreme Court] opinions," and that "[i]t does not
seem useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously
baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it" (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511
U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
220. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
221. For examples of decisions treating Justice Breyer's concurrence as the McIntyre holding,
see Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 6291812, at *2 (S.D.
Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) ("[Iun applying [McIntyre], the Court must consider Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion as the holding of the Court, as he concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds." (citing Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-TMP, 2011 WL
4443626, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011)); and Dram Techs. LLC v. America 11 Group, Inc., No.
2:10-CV-45- TJW, 2011 WL 4591902, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) ("Under the rule from
Marks, the concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, which concurs in the Judgment on much narrower
grounds, is the binding holding from the Supreme Court.").
222. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
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jurisdiction where a defendant does not 'inten[d] to submit to the power of a
sovereign' and cannot 'be said to have targeted the forum'; 223 (3) Justice Breyer
premises his conclusion that jurisdiction was not proper in McIntyre on a narrow
view of the factual record in that case; 224 and (4) Justice Breyer recognizes that
if the
exercising jurisdiction would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent
2 25
evidentiary record suggested potential customers in the forum state.
VI. CONCLUSION

The lack of a majority opinion in McIntyre is certainly disappointing for
those who hoped for "greater clarity" about the permissible scope of jurisdiction
in stream of commerce cases, 226 and to resolve the "decades-old questions left
open in Asahi."227 Nonetheless, the three opinions in McIntyre are likely to play
important roles as the debate over personal jurisdiction unfolds in this new
millennium. Those opinions merit close examination, even if they fail to
conclusively resolve questions that have long lingered about the Supreme
Court's doctrine on personal jurisdiction.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 2793 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2788 (plurality opinion)).
See supra text accompanying notes 193-201.
See supra text accompanying notes 202-207.
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2785.

